

**CONTINGENCY STATEMENT  
ON THE COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY FORMULATION**

The Agency maintains close cooperation and consultation with other government agencies in arms control and disarmament policy formulation.

The group which has primary responsibility for recommending United States policy relating to arms control and disarmament is the "Committee of Principals." It is composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Director of the U. S. Information Agency, and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology.

Policy recommendations of the Agency are considered by this group and others. Negotiations are never undertaken on an important measure until the President has consulted with representatives of the Committee and given his approval. In this connection, the Committee meets with the President as necessary.

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The basic policy which the United States adopted for test ban negotiations leading up to the present treaty, for example, was given the most thorough consideration.

In April, 1962, ACDA began a review of the positions the United States had taken on a nuclear test ban treaty. Extensive interagency consultation at the staff level preceded a series of meetings in which members of the Committee of Principals considered the problem with both the President and Vice President.

In the course of deliberating on this problem, consideration was given to all relevant aspects of national security, both as it might be affected on the one hand by a comprehensive test ban or a ban limited to outer space, the atmosphere and under water, and as it might be affected on the other hand by no test ban. Various aspects of the problem were examined such as the effect on the United States-U.S.S.R. military balance, with and without a test ban; the possibility and extent of the diffusion of nuclear weapons, both with and without a nuclear testing agreement; an analysis of the possibility of maintaining readiness to test and an analysis of the possibility of Soviet clandestine underground testing.

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As a result of these considerations, the decision was reached that a comprehensive test ban treaty would be in the national interest. At the same time, the decision was made that if the Soviet Union continued to indicate its unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspection the United States would be prepared to accept a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space<sup>and</sup> ~~or~~ under water--the environments in which a ban on tests could be effectively verified without the necessity of ~~on-site~~ inspections on a draft of such a Soviet soil. It was ~~this~~ treaty that served as a basis for the test ban agreement reached at Moscow.

The following schedule of interagency coordination leading up to the tabling of these two draft treaties was submitted to the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee by Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. It is contained in the record of the hearings conducted by that Subcommittee during September 1962.

"In connection with the test ban proposals, there was an ad hoc interagency committee formed, sponsored by ACDA and chaired by Dr. Long or Mr. Fisher. The usual participants included representatives from DOD (including JCS), AEC, State, White House, CIA, and ACDA.

"The first of these meetings was held in the latter part of April and further meetings were held periodically

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during the following 2 months with the last regular meeting being held on July 3. At these meetings various possible treaty drafts were discussed and all participants expressed and explained their views.

"Following the July 3 meeting, preliminary draft treaties of both a limited and comprehensive nature were sent to the agencies which had been represented in the working committee for formal comment.

"On July 20, 1962, the members of the Committee of Deputies (to the principals) met to discuss the drafts and other disarmament items. Following the July 20 meeting, two more drafts of each treaty were circulated for comment by the interested agencies in preparation for the Committee of Principals' meeting held on July 26.

"The July 26 meeting of principals was followed by three successive meetings of the principals with the President on July 27, 30, and August 1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanied the DOD representatives at each of these meetings of principals.

"On August 8 another limited test ban treaty draft was circulated for comment, followed by an August 14 draft of a comprehensive ban.

"On August 16 a special working group meeting was held to discuss the "Peaceful Uses" article of the treaties. On August 17 a limited treaty draft was circulated for comment.

"The foregoing interagency coordination culminated in the two proposed treaties tabled in Geneva August 27, 1962."

I might add that, in the later stage of this consideration, The President supplemented the group by recalling Ambassador Dean from Geneva and asking two members of the General Advisory

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Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John J. McCloy, the Chairman, and Mr. Robert Lovett, to participate in the deliberations.

Continuing interagency coordination extending to the Moscow discussions is reflected by the following quotation from the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the treaty:

"Early in the committee's hearings, the question arose as to whether the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been adequately represented in the development of policy on the limited test ban treaty and the content of the treaty. Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified on this question. The burden of their testimony showed that the chiefs of the uniformed services had been intimately involved with the question. General Taylor is a member of the Committee of Principals, the top-level unit within the executive branch which reviews major questions of national security before they are presented to the President. As indicated earlier, article IV, the treaty's withdrawal clause, was simplified and made more flexible to take account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, offered this comment:

' . . . the Chiefs have been . . . dealing with various types of test ban agreements for a couple or 3 years . . . . You will recall that General Taylor testified that starting on about the 15th of June, he asked the Joint Staff, to review a possible limited test ban proposal, although we had no specific wording to deal with. This arose as a result of talks between a European political leader and Mr. Khrushchev.

'You will also recall on the 2d of July Mr. Khrushchev made a speech in East Berlin, at which

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time he laid down in rather general terms the type of treaty that would be acceptable to him. At that time, we stepped up the tempo of our activities.

'And then, of course, we were aware that the Harriman mission was going to Moscow. General Taylor, himself, participated in meetings of the Committee of Principals on this subject. He did make us aware of the results of these deliberations.'

This type of interagency coordination covers other policy questions ranging from general and complete disarmament proposals to possible agreements in such areas as the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, and specific measures related to halting or slowing down the arms race.